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This essay is parasitical in nature. It reviews Orford and Hoffman’s excellent book with great admiration, 
but treats it as a host organism from which benefits can be derived for environmental law scholarship. 
The reasons for so doing are various. Public international law (‘PIL’) is, unlike environmental law, a field of 
law that has long been the site of theorisation about the nature of law, the purpose and product of 
theory, and its challenges. Indeed, according to some well placed interlocutors, theory is an integral part 
of the method of PIL as “unlike other legal disciplines, international law usually involves a commitment 
on the part of those who have recourse to it.”1 Something similar could be said of environmental law. 
Unusual is the environmental lawyer that does not subscribe to environmentalism, or that might write a 
title such as “The Limits of Environmental Law”, stressing the limitedness of what environmental law can 
achieve, or conceding that its many global problems are simply unsolvable.2 In this vein, PIL and 
environmental law are closely related fields – if not siblings, then at the very least first cousins with points 
of shared sympathy. Amongst these would be their common idealism, a vision for a world ordered by 
rules which depending on one’s view is either a signal strength3 or futile moralizing4. Alternatively, PIL 
and environmental law may be seen as favoured aunt/uncle and young adult – Michael to Paul Foot, say 
– with PIL as the elder, and environmental law the fond though far from uncritical descendant. It might 
not do to subject these metaphors to too much scrutiny, but the fact remains that many environmental 
lawyers, and so much environmental law, draw inspiration from the international legal order.  
 
Having summarised the approach of the book in Part 2, the discussion moves to a survey of the state of 
‘the theory of environmental law’ in Part 3. The survey is tentative for the obvious reason that such an 
endeavour is necessarily precarious. Treating such a variegated topic in a small number of words can 
only be done with the caveats and circumspection, but nonetheless, some broad findings are posited. 
                                                     
1 James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi (eds), The Cambridge Companion to International Law (1st edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2012). 
2 c.f. Jack L Goldsmith and Eric A Posner, The Limits of International Law (OUP USA 2007). 
3 Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (3 edition, 
OUP Oxford 2009). 
4 Goldsmith and Posner (n 2). 
Orford A and Hoffmann F (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of 
International Law (OUP Oxford 2016) 
Review Essay 
 
Part 4 develops these arguments by making the case and spaces for environmental law theorising. Part 5 
concludes.  
 
2. A Conspectus 
 
The merest reflection will confirm that theorising about the nature and function of international law has 
deep roots. Foundational figures such as Grotius were as much sophisticated political theorists as natural 
and international lawyers.5 Moreover, their theorising was a deeply practical enterprise, informing and 
central to the debates of the day. Consider the eighteenth century Dutch jurist Cornelis van Bynkershoek. 
He wrote in a time of contrasting approaches to what we would today call ocean management, with the 
dominant approach being the ‘freedom of the sea’, in contrast to those which asserted claims to 
sovereignty.6 One of the primary justifications for the ‘freedom of the seas’ was the presumed 
inexhaustible abundance of the seas, which entailed that there was no reason for the assertion of 
national dominion. To the contemporary reader, any such notion of a ‘commons’ immediately raises the 
prospect of its tragedy, although Hardin7 was not the first to recognise this. Van Bynkershoek opposed 
the freedom of the seas on the grounds that “a res communis can be made almost useless by 
promiscuous use, as often happens in a sea which has been fished out.”8 Borne from similar concerns, in 
the late nineteenth century international organisations such as the International Sugar Union emerged to 
regulate the global production, trade and use of natural resources,9 and by the mid-century attempts to 
codify territorial seas were well advanced. While the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 10 
cannot be categorized as only an environmental agreement, norms protecting the environment are a 
significant part of it.11  
                                                     
5 SC Neff, Hugo Grotius on the Law of War and Peace (Cambridge University Press 2011) xxiv-xxxii. 
6 The debate is typified by the ‘battle of the books’ between Grotius’s Mare Liberum (1609) and Seldon’s 
Mare Clausum (1635), see Timothy Brook, Mr Selden’s Map of China: The Spice Trade, a Lost Chart & the 
South China Sea (Profile Books 2014). 
7 Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243. 
8 Koen Staplebroek, ‘Trade, Chartered Companies, and Mercantile Associations’ in Bardo Fassbender and 
Anne Peters (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford University Press 
2012). 
9 Kurt Wilk, ‘International Affairs: The International Sugar Régime’ (1939) 33 The American Political 
Science Review 860. 
10 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3. 
11 Ibid, Part XII, “Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment”. 
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Against this background, the editors’ introduction states their aim as to “provide readers with a sense of 
the diverse projects that have been understood or characterised as exercises in theorizing about 
international law as over the past centuries, explore which aspects of international law have seemed 
important to theorize about at different times and places, and analyse the uses to which different 
theories of international law have been put.”12 From these aims they generate a series of broad questions 
that with minor tailoring are no less serviceable for environmental lawyers: what do environmental 
lawyers think of as theory, and how does it relate to the discipline and profession? What is the proper 
relationship between theories of environmental law and theorizing in philosophy, sociology, economics 
etc? Should the practice of environmental law be measured against theories and standards derived from 
outside the discipline, or against the values embedded in professional practices and vocabularies? One 
notable feature of the editors’ approach is that they do not seek to impose coherence to their subject 
matter, but rather convey “a sense of the theory of international law as a wide-ranging tradition that is 
dynamic, pluralist, and politically engaged.”13 
 
As with other Oxford Handbooks, the book is divided into thematic Parts. ‘Histories’, ‘Approaches’, 
‘Regimes and Doctrines’, and ‘Debates’ collectively comprise a formidable forty eight substantive 
chapters. The authors themselves are a stellar group, not exclusively theorists, often writing on topics for 
which they are well known. A not-quite-random selection from Part I would include Martti Koskenniemi 
on ‘Transformations of Natural Law: Germany 1648-1815’, Anthony Anghie on ‘Imperialism and 
International Legal Theory’, and Robert Howse on ‘Schmitt, Schmitteanism, and Contemporary 
International Legal Theory’. Each of these chapters is elegantly written, traversing broad intellectual 
terrains, and engaging. Despite the risks, there is precious little that is commonplace or indulgent. The 
authors have sought, with success, to ground their arguments in present day scholarly debates and 
current legal controversies. Howse in particular makes his points with considerable forthrightness. In a 
discussion of the ways in which Schmitt is often deployed “as a set of constructs that can be added on to 
workmanlike doctrinal scholarship in order to increase its theoretical octane”14, he choses to dismantle 
                                                     
12 Anne Orford and Florian Hoffmann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law 
(OUP Oxford 2016). 
13 ibid 17. 
14 ibid 226. 
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Nehal Bhuta’s use and (in Howse’s view) misuse of Schmitt in various human rights law contexts, 
including targeted killing. Not all the victims are on foreign battle fields.  
 
The thirteen chapters under the rubric of ‘Histories’ span as well as time and personalities, territories 
from the European cradle of international law to the Ottoman Empire, China, Russia, and others. One 
lesson which ought to be obvious but bears stressing is that context – historical, cultural, territorial – 
deeply informs the theorising of international law and as such it is a diverse, often contradictory, pursuit. 
This point is driven home in Part II (‘Approaches’), which consists of a similarly well-focussed set of 
chapters on topics including natural law (Gordon), Marxism (Knox), realism (Jütersonke), and 
constructivism (Dos Reis and Kessler). Again, leading figures contribute, most notably perhaps Samantha 
Besson (‘Moral Philosophy and International Law’) whose own work could reasonably be characterised as 
a foundation stone for the book under review.15 Her chapter initially explains the prevalence of moral 
philosophizing about international law and questions how best that normative theorizing might be done. 
Her call is for an end to the “sterile opposition between ‘realist’ and so-called ‘moralist’ approaches to 
international law…the way we do theory of international law should reflect the normativity of the practice 
of international law and be responsive to the pivotal role of normative reasoning in that practice qua 
self-reflective practice.”16 No less fascinating is “Global Administrative Law and Deliberative Democracy” 
by Benedict Kingsbury, Megan Donaldson, and Rodrigo Vallejo. This attempts to complete some 
unfinished business from the first articulation of ‘GAL’,17 namely its “’bracket[ing] the question of 
democracy’ as too ambitious an ideal for global administration.”18 Responding to criticism of this 
omission and building on their original lines of argument, “this chapter is an initial attempt to open the 
brackets and bring GAL and democracy into the conversation.”19 Arguing that GAL’s innumerable sites of 
power cohere with schemes of deliberative democracy beyond the state, and that both institutional 
entrepreneurship and ‘GAL lawyering’ are engaged in democratic striving, the claim is that GAL is a fluid 
phenomenon in the process of articulating and contesting its legitimacy credentials rather than 
establishing them. 
 
                                                     
15 Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of International Law (OUP Oxford 2010). 
16 Orford and Hoffmann (n 11) 405-6. 
17 Benedict Kingsbury, N Krisch and Richard B Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ 
(2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15. 
18 Orford and Hoffmann (n 11) 526. 
19 ibid. 
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Part III (‘Regimes and Doctrines’) is perhaps the most familiar element of the book, dealing as it does 
with what might be thought of the classical debates of PIL, namely, the nature of its sources 
(d’Aspremont), international legal personality(Parfitt), jurisdiction (Noll), the use of force (Kritsiotis), free 
trade (Orford), and so on. Of most direct interest to readers of this journal would likely be the chapter of 
Stephen Humphreys and Yoriko Otomo.20 Whatever else may be said of it, International Environmental 
Law is a deeply under-theorised subject.21 In this respect it is somewhat similar to general environmental 
law – see section 3 below. It is striking that even as recently as 2007, a major text such as The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law could manage to avoid a dedicated chapter on the 
subject’s legal theory,22 although some chapters (i.e. Toope’s) did engage points of conceptual 
importance.23 An upswing in IEL’s engagement with legal theory can be tracked to books such as The 
Philosophy of International Law24 and The Cambridge Companion to International Law.25 In the case of 
the former though it might be noted that discussions of the environment are handled by ethicists such as 
Crisp26 rather than lawyers reflecting on their discipline from an internal perspective, and for the latter 
whilst the approach is broadly conceptual, legal theory as such is not engaged.27 Given this assessment, 
Theorizing International Environmental Law is a particularly welcome chapter. 
 
Humphreys and Otomo commence by noting the limited scope of IEL. With little-to-nothing to say about 
the global food regime or natural resources, they describe their subject as “marginalia complemented by 
effluvia…[characterized by] general peripherality… ‘soft law’ [and] often dependent on other disciplines 
                                                     
20 Stephen Humphreys and Yoriko Otomo, ‘Theorizing International Environmental Law’ in Anne Orford 
and Florian Hoffmann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law (OUP Oxford 
2016). 
21 C.f. C Stone, The Gnat is Older than Man: Global Environment and Human Agenda (Princeton UP 1993) 
– an early example of this critique, theorising the extent to which environmental problems should be 
conceived as global or local, albeit by an ethicist rather than a lawyer. 
22 Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey, The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental 
Law (Oxford University Press, USA 2007). 
23 Stephen J Toope, ‘Formality and Informality’ in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (OUP Oxford 2007). 
24 Besson and Tasioulas (n 15). 
25 Crawford and Koskenniemi (n 1). 
26 Roger Crisp, ‘Ethics and International Environmental Law’ in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas 
(eds), The Philosophy of International Law (OUP Oxford 2010). 
27 Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Conserving the World’s Resources’ in James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi (eds), 
The Cambridge Companion to International Law (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2012). 
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altogether – science and economics – for direction and legitimacy”.28 More cutting, they see in IEL “many 
of the trappings of a faith [and] a kind of global moral authority [whose] principles promise the radical 
reshaping of ‘business-as-usual’. In vain in it seems: for, again more than most bodies of international 
law, that is law crying in the wilderness.” 29 They are note the limitedness of relevant theoretical attention 
IEL has attracted – a matter discussed below. One might argue on the specifics but few would disagree 
with the authors that there is a gap between IEL’s scope and tools, and the problems it is charged with 
addressing. Of the many complex issues generated by this account, the authors focus on the “constituent 
conceptual elements that generate [IEL’s] specific energy and propel its contradictions”, deploying two 
theoretical lens: the philosophical approach of European Romantic movement, and colonial governance 
practices.  
 
The first of these, a staple of Environmental Humanities studies, set in place many of the notions of 
‘nature’ that are routinely taken for granted – that it is ‘unspoilt’ and ‘wild’, imbued with moral 
significance, and so on. Cultural studies and its cultural materialism approach are prevalent, and the work 
of Raymond Williams looms large. In particular Williams’ famous essay The Idea of Nature is deployed, 
which disaggregates ‘man’ from ‘nature’, and hence for present purposes places nature in a position of 
dominion in respect of man’s law – an idea which obviously has deep roots in European Christianity.30 
Combined with romanticism, nature now becomes an object of aesthetic wonder and awe for humans, a 
site of recreation and spiritual growth. The textual linkages of these ideas with the IEL canon, especially 
treaty preambles, is deftly handled. The task of colonial administrators to manage the natural resources 
under their dominion generates a different mindset, one which seeks to “ensure sustainable long-term 
access to the resources that increasingly fuelled a global economy.”31 Here the environmental history 
literature does much of the heavy lifting,32 combined with readings of early conservation treaties such as 
the International Convention on the Conservation of Wild Animals, Birds, and Fish in Africa (1900).33 
Jointly these two narratives can be read as forerunners to IEL as we know it. They serve as its motivating 
                                                     
28 Humphreys and Otomo (n 19) 798. 
29 Ibid 799. 
30 Raymond Williams, ‘The Idea of Nature’, Problems in materialism and culture: selected essays (Verso 
1980). 
31 Ibid 799-800. 
32 See generally, Andrew C Isenberg (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Environmental History (Reprint 
edition, Oxford University Press 2017). 
33 188 ConTS 418. 
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force, yet both have very specific origins. The one is an aestheticized experience of the natural world 
which places the human experience (and a very particular human experience it must be said) at its centre. 
Its traces are present in the aspirations of extent IEL but, argue the authors, “its implicit invocation of the 
divine”34 remains unarticulated and unfulfilled. More developed are the patterns of colonial development. 
Framed as they are as “viewing natural resources in terms of global production and demand, and 
managing them within a context of international trade”,35 this propelling force of IEL resembles better the 
world we know. Both approaches treat the non-human as a ‘resource’, and while IEL “excoriates the 
dump, the waste, the loss of life and species…it is not equipped to deal with it, for – in Walter Benjamin’s 
unparalleled image, ‘as storm is blowing from Paradise [and] this storm is what we call progress.”36 
 
Part IV, ‘Debates’, details a number of key points contention in PIL theory, staking out the present and 
potential futures of each. Each of the five chapters in this shortest of Parts contains themes of relevance 
to environmental questions. Yael Paz on securalism in international law, Skouteris on progress, Hoffman 




3. The State of Environmental Law Theory 
 
When reading this book, a recurrent thought for this reviewer was ‘what would a parallel volume on the 
theory of environmental law theory look like?’ Safe to say, it would not stretch to well over 1000 pages, 
excluding scholarly apparatus. Would it achieve such impressive scope and depth, or attract such a 
distinguished range of established scholars along with so many interesting up-and-coming ones? This 
may be a false comparison given the pedigree and deep traditions of PIL. However, if a more 
comparable legal sub-discipline were chosen – say European Union legal theory – it is highly doubtful 
whether environmental law theory would shine in comparison. Yet both are of a similar age, and our 
subject has the advantage of enjoying global rather than regional attention. Whatever the reason, it is 
hard to argue with Humphreys & Otomo’s contention that international environmental law theorizing is 
                                                     
34 Humphreys and Otomo (n 19) 817. 
35 ibid 818. 
36 ibid 819. 
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poorly developed.37 Indeed this is so in comparison with almost any other legal sub-discipline that one 
cares to name – compare the health of legal theoretical work in the fields of 
contract/constitutional/criminal/obligations/et seq.  
 
More generally, what traction can it be said that theory in general, and environmental law theory in 
particular, have on environmental law? Consider Absent Environments.38 This has been described as in 
that rarefied category of books which help “to redefine and shape the discipline.”39 It takes a well-
established approach – Teubnerian autopoiesis, which has been profoundly important in mainstream 
legal sub-disciplines such as European Union and constitutional law – to interrogate the meanings of ‘the 
environment’ when considered in the light of concepts such as humanity, urbanisation, and wilderness. 
Yet in the decade since its publication, its actual shaping of the discipline has been limited. Taking the 
Journal of Environmental Law as a proxy for the sub-discipline of environmental law, it is notable how 
rarely Absent Environments is actually cited. Only one article has actually engaged with its core themes in 
any depth,40 and a small handful have cited it as representative of ‘critical environmental law’.41 This is of 
course no criticism of the book itself or its arguments or methods. Far from it. Rather, its meagre 
reception into the body of environmental law scholarship, despite the imprimatur of a scholar no less 
distinguished than Jane Holder, suggests (I put it no higher) a cultural reluctance to engage with the 
large theoretical questions qua environmental law where other sub-disciplines of law are less chary. 
There is of course a need to draw here a distinction between pure and applied theory. The latter is not 
unknown in environmental law. What is in shorter supply are attempts to grapple with the essential 
nature of environmental law as compared with conceptualisation for the (far from invaluable task) of 
problem-solving. In this mode, theory is the handmaid to interpretation and systematization of a body of 
                                                     
37 ibid 799. 
38 Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Absent Environments: Theorising Environmental Law and the 
City (Routledge-Cavendish 2009). 
39 Jane Holder, ‘Book Review of Absent Environments: Theorising Environmental Law and the City’ (2008) 
20 Journal of Environmental Law 496. 
40 Vito De Lucia, ‘Competing Narratives and Complex Genealogies: The Ecosystem Approach in 
International Environmental Law’ (2015) 27 Journal of Environmental Law 91, 4–6, 26. 
41 Yaffa Epstein, ‘Favourable Conservation Status for Species: Examining the Habitats Directive’s Key 
Concept through a Case Study of the Swedish Wolf’ (2016) 28 Journal of Environmental Law 221; 
Elizabeth Fisher and others, ‘Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate About Environmental Law 
Scholarship’ (2009) 21 Journal of Environmental Law 213. 
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rules. The more profound inquiries concerning the normative foundations or political implications of said 
body of rules is a separate and less common practice.42 
 
One response to this tentative claim is the methodological one that JEL is a weak proxy for 
‘environmental law’. Indeed, a broader frame of reference would certainly bolster the argument, and 
perhaps invert it. I look forward to those studies. Another response would a variant of a familiar trope of 
environmental law, that its sheer breadth is a barrier to conceptualisation. The ‘breadth problem’ is that 
environmental law, as is well known, encompasses such an unusually broader range of legal disciplines – 
public international, public, EU, property, tort, to name just the most obvious – that its theorisation is 
unusually demanding. The major reference points enjoyed by, say, constitutional or trusts law are simply 
not available to environmental lawyers. These reference points, such as sovereignty or accountability or 
democratic legitimacy for the constitutional lawyer, are both enduring and deployed by scholars in many 
other jurisdictions. Such are the range of concerns of environmental law, the argument goes, that apt 
theories are less readily at hand. A version of this argument is made by Fisher et al when discussing 
environmental law’s ‘incoherence’ in the context of its perceived immaturity. It is, as a subject “ad hoc, a 
conceptual hybrid, straddling many fault lines…much ink has been spilled attempting to define the 
boundaries of the subject [but] no definitive definition of the subject has been forthcoming.”43 Somewhat 
ironically, the authors of this estimable piece are themselves the victims of the incoherence problem they 
describe. When later in the paper discussing the methodological challenge that governance presents for 
environmental law (235ff), the authors refer to understanding “Coase’s theory” as necessary to 
understanding emissions trading schemes (at 237). What is meant by this is somewhat unclear. From the 
context of trading schemes, the reference is presumably to the Coase Theorem and its analysis of 
property rights and transaction costs for the purposes of determining rights and liabilities.44 However 
references to “Coase’s theory” are more likely to refer to his much earlier ‘theory of the firm’,45 which 
highlights the importance of the fact (hitherto underappreciated) that markets do not operate costlessly, 
                                                     
42 A somewhat recent, and very welcome counter-example is Jane Holder's, ‘An Idea of Ecological Justice 
in the EU’ in Dimitry Kochenov, Grainne de Burca and Andrew Williams (eds), Europe’s Justice Deficit? 
(Hart Publishing 2015). See also the rich seam of work produced by Ole Pedersen. 
43 Fisher and others (n 40) 219–220. 
44 RH Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 The Journal of Law & Economics 1.  
45 RH Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4 Economica 386. 
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and that these transaction costs have important consequences for the formation of firms in preference to 
market exchange.46  
 
Such minor considerations apart, whilst the fact of conceptual incoherence might be accepted, it need 
not be conceded that its ‘breadth’ or hybridity are axiomatically disadvantageous. One could readily see 
that the “different historical foundations for the subject [such as] property law, pollution law, tort law and 
planning law”47 provide ready access to extant, mature, and well developed bodies of theory that have 
already addressed issues pertinent to environmental law. Indeed, such is the position of one of the very 
few dedicated environmental law theory monographs, The Philosophical Foundations of Environmental 
Law.48 The anti-theoretical nature of environmental law is arguably at odds with, rather than caused by, 
its sub-disciplinary promiscuity. 
 
An alternative explanation for environmental law’s anti-theoretical nature derives, at least in part, from 
theoretical indifference of one of its parents, International Environmental Law. As noted above, until very 
recently major text such as The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, in common with 
all the major IEL textbooks, could avoid any meaningful discussion of the subject’s legal theory.49 One 
should not however omit mentioning landmark works such as Legitimacy and Legality in International 
Law: An Interactional Account.50 Drawing on Lon Fuller’s distillation of the principles of legality,51 Brunnee 
and Toope explore the extent to which the rule of law operates in a variety of international arena 
including torture and the use of force,52 and climate change.53 In each of these examples they inquire 
about the existence of international legal norms, and whether they are sustained or undermined by 
international agreements and the prevailing practices of nations, but also the media, NGOs, and other 
citizens. The state is not the only actor, even though as the lead author of international law it is 
                                                     
46 Harold Demsetz, ‘The Theory of the Firm Revisited’ (1988) 4 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 
141. 
47 Fisher and others (n 39) 229. 
48 Sean Coyle and Karen Morrow, The Philosophical Foundations of Environmental Law: Property, Rights 
and Nature (Hart 2004). 
49 Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey (n 21). 
50 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional 
Account (Cambridge University Press 2010). 
51 Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law (Revised edition, Yale University Press 1969).  
52 Brunnée and Toope (n 49). 
53 ibid. 
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dismaying how often it is also the transgressor: “the law of the jungle is often unrecognised by the very 
people who help to make it.”54 In respect of climate change, the authors carefully trawl through the 
history and substance of the UNFCCC to determine whether it can be characterised as resting on widely 
shared understandings. They conclude that it does, albeit more on the procedural side than the 
substantive one. They then work through Fuller’s eight principles (generality, public promulgation, 
prospectiveness, intelligibility, freedom from contradictions, stability, possibility to obey, and proper 
administration) to determine whether the climate regime’s purported legal rules satisfy the criteria of 
legality and as such count as genuine laws. Many of the criteria self-evidently obtain – ie. generality, 
promulgation – whereas others such as intelligibility are more challenging (UNFCCC Article 4(2)(a) 
anyone?)  though with the Paris Agreement arguably better founded now than ever. The argument can 
be summarised thus: “that the convention’s procedural provisions fare well on the legality scale whereas 
its substantive aspects do less so [including the] congruence between international practice and the 
requirements of the UNFCCC.”55 Quite apart from its close analysis of the climate regime, what the 
Fullerian, interactional, approach brings to this account is its characterisation of what constitutes a 
meaningful global legal regime to address climate change. Beyond treaty negotiation and standard 
setting, “a long-term agreement on emission reductions is unlikely to be attainable, and unlikely to have 
lasting obligatory force, unless it rests on a strong foundation of shared understandings, respects the 
requirements of legality, and is embedded in a vibrant practice of legality.”56 
 
The absence of environmental law theorising is sometimes welcomed, albeit in a particular fashion by 
Fisher at al, who rail against theory which presents itself as “grand” [241] or “over-arching” [243].57 What 
is meant by these adjectives is unclear however beyond a suspicion of ‘theories of everything’, which is 
probably quite uncontentious. Fisher’s objection in these terms is somewhat muddied two pages later 
when other theories which might readily be perceived in these terms are elsewhere applauded, namely 
Ulrich Beck’s wide-ranging sociology of risk (245). Here however Orford and Hoffman offer some 
assistance, drawing a distinction between ‘grand’ and ‘technical’ forms of theorizing. The former is 
associated with nineteenth and early twentieth century work, which sought to “understand the role of law 
in international relations or to grasp the essential nature of international law” whereas the latter merely 




57 Fisher and others (n 40). 
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applies “an increasingly canonical body of well-established rules, principles, and concepts to the conduct 
of states and other international actors.”58 Whether or not that is the distinction that Fisher et al were 
seeking to draw, it remains the case that the default ethos of environmental law scholarship, in the UK 
and EU at least, is one that focuses on problem-solving as the telos of law. In this mode, theory’s function 
is limited to serving “as an aid to the interpretation and systematization of a body of rules, with questions 
about the historical pedigree, normative foundations, political implications, or practical consequences of 







This final section attempts a justification of theorizing environmental law. It cannot simply be assumed 
that this is a useful pastime, despite Kant’s well known injunction that theory and practice are two parts 
of an inseparable whole. Such arguments conventionally run along the lines of instrumental and intrinsic 
value – that in the former case legal theory is valuable to the extent that it enhances legal practice, and in 
the latter for the reason that it is essential to law as a field of study, and as a social practice.60 Whether 
legal theory genuinely develops a flexibility of mind and imagination in legal practitioners is probably 
something many teachers of theory would like to believe even if they struggled to demonstrate it. As 
Coleman notes though, the “most compelling arguments for legal theory, however, do not rely on its 
instrumental value. Rather, they depend on the role legal theory plays in the integrity of law as a field of 
study and as a social practice.”61 What follows explores the first of these arguments – that theory 
enhances our understanding of our scholarship by wresting it from the grip of either black letter law, or 
the social preferences of legal actors or indeed other scholars.  
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Economic theory has loomed large in the theorising of other social sciences, largely owing to the 
imperial ambitions of economics in recent decades.62 Law has not been immune from this trend, far from 
it. As Malloy notes, “for better or for worse, and without regard to one’s politics, the borrowing of market 
concepts has transformed legal reasoning and captured an authoritative position in the legal 
imagination.”63 Environmental law and in particular climate law have been infected by this incubus for a 
number of reasons. The central work of climate change debates was written not by a physical scientist, 
much less a lawyer, but an economist – the Stern Review.64 Moreover, market mechanisms deeply 
informed by microeconomic theorizing have been the dominant regulatory approach in climate action. 
From the Kyoto Protocol to the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme to the deliberately obscure Article 6 of 
the Paris Agreement and any number of national and subnational trading schemes, market-based 
approaches are the default tool for climate policymakers. As I have argued elsewhere, with few 
exceptions, environmental lawyers have treated the theoretical underpinnings of these arrangements 
poorly.65 That though is very much a past debate. Rather than looking to foundational texts with the 
mark of Chicago upon them, new strains of economic thought are emerging which offer very new 
diagnoses and prognoses of the climate challenge, and also wholly new avenues for legal thought and 
action. Foremost amongst these is the work of Michael Grubb and his ‘three domains of sustainable 
development’ approach.66  
 
The starting point is that neoclassical frameworks in economic prescriptions have been unduly influential 
in economic thinking and the policy process. By neoclassical (or welfare) is meant the theory that strives 
for economic optimisation based on relative prices and representative agents armed with rational 
expectations. Market design, regulation and pricing are the primary tools – for the purposes of climate 
action, this means carbon (externality) pricing. Self-evidently however, these methods have failed over 
the past two decades. The reasons are not merely familiar stories of over-allocation and regulatory 
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capture, but rooted in the deep structure of this dominant mode of economics (Grubb’s ‘Second 
Domain’). While efficient markets and carbon pricing have a role to play, they are condemned to 
continuing failure if they continue to ignore the ‘First Domain’ of behavioural economics which focusses 
on the motivations, capabilities and opportunities faced by actors who we know are not wholly rational. 
Rather we know that individuals are creatures of habit, risk averse to change, myopic, inattentive to 
intangible costs, and so on. The solutions to these ‘imperfections’ (in the language of neoclassicism) is 
found not in economics but the behavioural sciences and indeed in law which identifies and seeks to 
guide actions towards more environmentally positive patterns. The resistance of many householders to 
insulation, which offers better rates of return than the market, yet which remains uninstalled, is but one 
of myriad practical examples. The ‘Third Domain’ of sustainable development acknowledges that 
avoiding 2C warming requires more than well functioning markets and duly ‘nudged’ consumers. There is 
a need for genuinely transformative pathways to dramatic decarbonization, through innovation, 
development and resilience which alter the basis of existing technologies, infrastructure, supply chains 
and more. Here evolutionary theories lead, and innovation law which sees beyond an inevitable link 
between innovation and intellectual property towards the reform of IP institutions, open innovation, and 
the recalibration of IP to climate change. 
 
Planetary Economics is grounded in the idea of the complementarity of different processes which lead at 
different social and temporal scales, with each domain having a specific role to play in the transformation 
of the global systems necessary to comprehensively address climate change. Associated theories and 
disciplines are viewed as complementary rather than competitive. The challenge is to understand the 
contexts and problems for which one or other theory is more appropriate. Grubb himself is open to the 
likelihood that although originally expressed in terms of different foundational micro-economic theories, 
the Three Domains framework yields more powerful insights when deployed with the complementary 
disciplines which will shape it (ch12). The mantle then is there to be picked up by lawyers to minimise the 
‘psychological distance’ of climate change (Spence, Poortinga, and Pidgeon 2012), and facilitate the 
strategic investments essential to delivery of Paris.  
 
Although space precludes a fuller discussion here, environmental lawyers could similarly make greater 
use of well developed theories in public and constitutional law when exercising their obsession with 
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climate litigation.67 NGOs and pressure groups, no less than academic lawyers continue to be entranced 
by this tool yet readers of the literature could be forgiven for failing to be aware that it takes place 
against the backdrop of constitutional law’s most enduring question – what is the proper scope of the 
courts in making policy decisions? Decades of literature on the merits of civic republicanism versus liberal 
constitutionalism are rarely if ever reflected in the environmental law literature. Doubtless this is because 
many cases such as Urgenda,68 or Leghari69 come down the right way from a simplified 
environmental/climatic perspective. Nonetheless there remains an obligation to subject legal materials to 
proper standards of scrutiny, a task which at the minimum theory is well placed to do. 
 
 
5. Summing Up 
 
This essay travels across a book of international law theory, questions the limitedness of legal 
theorisations in environmental law, and then pinpoints the watershed between a legal theory that 
theorises about law per se and one, more familiar to environmental law, that looks more at application of 
frameworks. It might be pointed out that there is little surprise that PIL scholars engage more in legal 
theory than environmental laywers, simply because PIL is a legal system AND a discipline AND a subject. 
Environmental law is not a system, can barely be called a discipline OF law, although it maybe a discipline 
IN law. It is certainly a subject. But for these characteristics, it is perhaps predictable that little ‘pure 
theorising’ has been taking place. Although other paths taken in environmental law theorising are 
highlighted, (Brunnee and Toope, Absent Environments etc.) they have not been probed fully but rather 
identified as exceptions to a general practice of non-theorising. The kernel of a proposition of going 
back to public and constitutional law is suggested. May both interventions be further developed, and 
challenged.  
 
The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law is a wonderful book, rich in insights and 
intellectual integrity, it is a superbly marshalled venture for which the editors deserve great praise. They 
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have assembled an impressive team of international law theorists, of various stages of seniority, pointed 
them in the right direction and let them go. The direction is all important. All the papers address, in one 
way or another, the key questions of what work theory does for international law, and for this reviewer 
thereby trigger cognate questions for environmental law. How does it engage with theory? Whether in its 
minimalist (conceptualisation for the task of problem-solving) or maximalist (grappling with the essential 
nature of environmental law) modes, how can approaches from this book be deployed by environmental 
lawyers? A number of lines of further research are essayed, and readers are urged to pick up this fine 
book to develop more of their own. 
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